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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The trial court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-3-4(1). This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-2a-3. The final order by the trial court was entered on May 18, 
2006, and pursuant to Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendant Scott 
Rice's Notice of Appeal was filed on June 12, 2006. 
IL ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err in finding that Mr. Rice is not a party to the 
original contract and therefore he is not a prevailing party and not entitled to recover 
under the contract? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE NO. 1: The trial court's finding that 
Mr. Rice is not a prevailing party because he was not a party to the original contract is a 
conclusion of law which is reviewed for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 
757, 759 (Utah 1990)("The trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of 
law. We accord conclusions of law no particular deference, but review them for 
correctness." (citations omitted)). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE NO. 1: This issue was fully briefed and argued 
and the final order entered by the trial court on May 18, 2006 specifically addresses this 
issue. 
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HI. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a, Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from a contract collection action brought by Express Recovery 
Services (Collection Agency) against Rice and MTI as a dba of Rice. The trial court granted 
judgment against Rice and MTI and awarded attorney's fees to Collection Agency. Rice 
appealed the issues relating to his personal liability to Collection Agency under the contract 
entered into by MTI, which was at the time of the contract a valid Utah Corporation. The Utah 
Court of Appeals vacated the judgment because Rice signed as the aged of a disclosed principal. 
On remand, Rice sought an award of attorney's fees under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-
56.5. The trial court found that the order was vacated because Rice was not a party to the 
contract and therefore as a non-party to the original contract he could not be a prevailing party 
under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56.5. Rice appeals the trial court's statutory 
interpretation and finding that he was not a party to the contract and therefore not a prevailing 
party under Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56.5. 
b. Course of Proceedings 
The case was filed by Collection Agency in 2003 seeking judgment against Rice and MTI 
based on a contract for advertising entered into between Collection Agency's predecessor, 
Directories, and MTI. After a bench trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Collection Agency 
for $5,601.45 and against MTI and Rice personally, and Collection Agency was awarded its 
attorney's fees under the contract. Rice filed a notice of appeal of the judgment entered against 
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him on October 6, 2004. The Utah Court of Appeals vacated the judgment entered by the trial 
court on January 23, 2006. On remand, Rice applied for his attorney's fees under Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-27-56.5, and the trial court denied his request on May 18, 2006. 
c. Disposition in the Court Below 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56.5 states: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil 
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed 
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions on the promissory note, written contract, 
or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
The trial court held that Rice is not a party to the original contract and therefore not a prevailing 
party, and did not award attorney's fees under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56.5. 
d. Statement of the Facts 
The facts germane to this appeal are not in dispute: 
1. Rice signed a contract with Directories (which contract was assigned to Collection 
Agency) on October 13, 2001 as President of MTI, a Utah Corporation in good standing. Rice 
was authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of MTI. (Findings f 2). 
2. The contract involved advertising Directories was to provide for MTI. (Findings f 
i ) 
3. A dispute arose regarding the advertising, and MTI refused to pay. 
4. On April 20, 2003, Collection Agency filed a complaint against Scott Rice 
individually, alleging that Collection Agency is the assignee of a contract which Rice entered into 
for services, received the services, but never paid under the contract. (Complaint at ff 4, 5) 
5. Collection Agency stated in its complaint that under the contract the defendant 
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was obligated to pay the attorney's fees. (Complaint f 6). 
6. After the case was tried before the court, the trial court found money was due to 
Directories/ Collection Agency under the contract. The contract was the basis for the debt. 
(Findings fflf 6-8, Conclusions f 6). 
7. At the time that this action was commenced against Rice and MTI, MTI had been 
administratively dissolved by the Department of Commerce for allowing the corporate status to 
expire. (Findings ^ 10). 
8. At the time of trial MTI had been reinstated and was valid corporation. (Findings 
paragraph 11). 
9. The contract signed by Rice as President of MTI contained a provision at 
paragraph 11, which states: 
If Advertiser sells or discontinues business, no payment or amount 
due under the terms of the contract will be waived thereby. The 
signer of the contract guarantees payment of the amount due either 
directly or through escrow if the business is sold. Payment or 
amount due may be assumed by the New Owner, if name of 
business and phone number remains the same. 
(Findings HTf 13-14). 
10. The trial court found, solely based on the administrative suspension of MTI after 
the signing of the contract, that MTI had "discontinued" business and that Rice was therefore 
personally liable for the debt solely under the contractual provision described above. (Findings 
12, 13 and 14; Conclusions 3,4 and 5). 
11. After a bench trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Collection Agency for 
$5,601.45 and against Rice personally, and Collection Agency was awarded its attorney's 
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fees. 
12. Rice filed a notice of appeal on October 6, 2004. 
13. On January 23, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's 
judgment on the basis that the personal guarantee provision of the contract was never 
triggered, and therefore Rice, as agent of the disclosed principal MTI, was not liable 
under the contract. 
14. After being forced to defend himself against Collection Agency's wrongful 
claims, and prevailing in his defense, Rice applied for his attorney's fees as the prevailing 
party. 
15. The trial court denied Rice's request, finding that since he was not a party 
to the contract he could not be the prevailing party under Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-27-56.5. 
16. The only issue on appeal is whether Rice is considered a prevailing party 
under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56.5. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is only one issue relevant to the appeal, whether Rice is considered a 
prevailing party to a contract dispute under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56.5. 
The trial court erred in concluding that Rice was not a prevailing party under section 78-
27-56.5 when Rice was wrongfully brought into this case against his will as a defendant 
under a written contract which allowed for attorney's fees. Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-27-56.5 was enacted to create a level playing field among parties claiming attorney's 
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fees under a contract. The level playing field statute posits that when a party is named as 
a defendant in a lawsuit based upon a contract which provides for attorney's fees, that 
defendant is equally entitled to an attorney's fees award should he prevail over the 
plaintiffs claims. 
V. ARGUMENT 
a- RICE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEFENDING 
THE CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER THE CONTRACT 
1. Rice is a Party to the Contract as an Agent of a Disclosed Principal 
It is undisputed that Collection Agency's brought this cause of action against Rice 
under a contract that Rice signed on behalf of MTI, as its president. Therefore, Rice 
prevailed in the litigation upon the showing that he was not personally liable on the 
contract, and the personal guarantee of the contract was not triggered. However, even 
though he was not personally liable under the contract, he was a party to the contract as 
the agent of a disclosed principal. As a party to the contract as the agent of a disclosed 
principal, Rice is entitled to enjoy the benefits of the contract. Because he was sued 
under a contract which awards attorney's fees to one party, he is entitled to attorney's fees 
under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56.5. 
"In Utah attorney's fees are awarded only if authorized by statute or contract. If 
provided for by contract, attorney's fees are awarded in accordance with the terms of that 
contract." Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct App. 
1993). When provided by contract, the attorney's fees are awarded in accordance with 
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the terms of the contract. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). 
Prior to 1986, under the above guidelines for the award of attorney's fees, if a contract 
only provided attorney's fees to one party, only that party could collect attorney's fees if 
litigation arose out of the contract. However, in 1986 the Utah legislature enacted Utah 
Code Annotate Section 78-27-56.5 to level the playing field. Section 78-27-56.5 states 
that, "A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil 
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing . . . when the 
provisions on the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one 
party to recover attorney's fees." Section 78-27-56.5 leveled the playing field by creating 
a legal right to recover attorney's fees where no legal right existed before. 
In the present case, Rice was sued under a contract to which he was a party, but for 
which he did not have personal liability. Since he prevailed over Collection Agency's 
claims against him, he is a prevailing party under Section 78-27-56.5, and under the 
contract, is entitled to attorney's fees. 
2. Rice is Entitled to Attorney's Fees Since He was Sued Under a 
Contract Which Provides for Attorney's Fees 
Assuming, arguendo, that Rice is not a party to the contract, under the 
circumstances of the present case, Rice would still be entitled to attorney's fees under 
Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56.5. The question of whether a non-party to a contract, 
who is involuntarily brought into litigation over a contract which provides for attorney's 
fees, can collect attorney's fees under Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56.5 has never been 
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answered by this Court. Utah law states that "attorney's fees are awarded only if 
authorized by statute or contract. If provided for by contract, attorney's fees are awarded 
in accordance with the terms of that contract." Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 
849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). And when provided by contract, the 
attorney's fees are awarded in accordance with the terms of the contract. Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). However, "a court may award costs 
and attorney's fees to either party thai prevails in a civil action based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing . . . when the provisions on the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees." Section 78-27-56.5 leveled the playing field by creating a legal right to 
recover attorney's fees where no legal right existed before. The question before this Court 
is how far does section 78-27-56.5 extend the legal right to recover attorney's fees. 
Considering the purposes of section 78-27-56.5, logic follows that when a defendant is 
sued under a contract which provides for attorney's fees, if that defendant prevails in the 
litigation, even by proving that he was not a party to the contract, the level playing field 
statute gives the defendant the same right as the plaintiff to collect attorney's fees under 
that contract. 
This Court considered the application of section 78-27.56.5 to a third party 
intervener in Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machinging Inc., 37 P.3d 267 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2001). In Anglin, Mark Anglin brought suit on a promissory note he had with 
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Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc. (CFM). Anglin 37 P.3d at 268. Shortly after 
filing suit he prevailed in obtaining a pre-judgment writ of garnishment on CFM's funds 
held by Blevins. Id Custom Steel Fabrication, Inc. (Custom Steel) had an earlier 
settlement agreement entered into by Blevins and Custom Steel. Id. Before Blevins could 
perform on the settlement agreement, Anglin filed suit against CFM and obtained a 
prejudgment writ of garnishment. Id. Custom Steel intervened and prevailed by having 
the garnishment dissolved. Id Custom Steel sought its attorney's fees since Anglin's 
case was based upon a promissory note which allowed for attorney's fees. Id The trial 
court denied fees and Custom Steel appealed the issue to this Court. Id This Court 
found that section 78-27-56.5 did not give a third party intervener, who sued upon an 
issue of priority, the right to collect attorney's fees under a promissory note to which it 
was not a party. Id. at 269. 
The facts in the present case are distinguishable from those in Anglin. In the 
present case, Rice is not an intervening party, rather he was brought into the litigation in 
an attempt to find him liable under the terms of the contract. Had Collection Agency 
prevailed under its cause of action against Rice, it would have been entitled to an award 
of attorney's fees. In fact, before this Court vacated the judgment by the trial court, the 
Collection Agency sought and was awarded its attorney's fees by the trial court. Under 
section 78-27-56.5, since Rice was brought into the present action in an attempt to find 
him liable for the terms of the contract, he is entitled to collect his attorney's fees as 
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provided by the contract which dragged him into the litigation. To find otherwise would 
create an inequality that section 78-27-56.5 seeks to abolish. 
Further, in Anglin the question centered on the priority of two agreements with 
Blevins: the promissory note held by Mark Anglin and the global settlement agreement 
entered into by Custom Steel. In Anglin, it appears that section 78-27-56.5 could not 
apply to Custom Steel, because even if Anglin had prevailed, the promissory note did not 
give him the right to collect attorney's fees against Custom Steel. That does not hold 
true in the present litigation. In the present case, the litigation is centered upon liability 
created in a contract which provides for attorney's fees. Since the litigation is centered 
upon liability created under the contract, and the contract provides that the plaintiff may 
recover attorney's fees should he prevail, section 78-27-56.5 grants the defendant 
reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees. 
Therefore, section 78-27-56.5 was created to grant reciprocal rights to recover 
attorney's fees to protect litigants and to level the playing field. The section protects 
litigants from parties who base their actions upon the tremendous advantage they have by 
knowing thait if he wins in litigation he will not have to pay for his attorney's fees, and if 
he loses he will not have to pay for the defendant's attorney's fees. Rice is a party section 
78-27-56.5 seeks to protect. Had he lost to Collection Agency he would have had to pay 
for their attorney's fees, however, now that he has won, he has a reciprocal right to 
recover his attorney's fees. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Rice is a party to the contract as an agent of a disclosed principal. Under the 
contract the prevailing party is entitled to his attorney's fees. As a party to the contract as 
an agent of a disclosed principal, Rice is entitled to his attorney's fees. Further, even if 
Rice is not considered a party to the contract, he is entitled to recover his attorney's fees 
under section 78-27-56.5 which provides reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees. 
Collection Agency sought to recover its attorney's fees, and had it prevailed Rice would 
have been required to pay its attorney's fees. Therefore, under section 78-27-56.5, Rice is 
entitled to receive his attorney's fees under the present litigation. This Court should 
reverse the lower Court and award Rice his attorney's fees in accordance with section 78-
27-56.5 in the amount of $32,534.12 plus the attorney's fees that have been incurred in 
this appeal. 
DATED this t^fbf October, 2006. 
ATKIN LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
Blake S. Atkir 
William O. Kimball 
Brennan H. Moss 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-27-56.5 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78. Judicial Code 
Part III. Procedure 
*il Chapter 27. Miscellaneous Provisions (Refs & Annos) 
-f§ 78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees—Reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a 
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
Laws 1986, c. 79, § 1. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Costs awarded upon judgment, see Rules Civ. Proc, Rule 54. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Costs kl94.14. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 102kl94.14. 
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GREM DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNT 
EDWrN B. PARRY, Esq. (#2532) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3782 West 2340 South, Suite B 
J.Q, Adams Building 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 486-2942 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
ZOOb NAY 1 8 A 9f 0 3 
OREM DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES, 
INC., (a Debt Collection Agency), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT RICE, dba MTI, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 030200718 
Judge Backlund 
Based on the Memorandum Decision and Remittitur of the Utah Court of Appeals vacating 
the judgment; 
It is hereby ordered that Defendant is not a party lo the original contract and therefore not a 
prevailing party. No attorney fees are awarded pursuant to Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication 
Machining, Inc., 37 P.3d 267,269; 434 Utah Adv. Rep. 21,2001 UT App 341, and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56-5. 
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,w^/£2^ 
Judg^fohn C. Backlund 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this *-j day of May. 2006, a true and correct copy of the above Order and 
Judgment was mailed, postage pre-paid in the United States mail to the following: 
Blake S Atlcin, Esq. 
Brennan H. Moss, Esq. 
Atkin Law Offices., PC. 
136 South Main #401A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
C.\ERS/Ordcr/Rice 
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I AUG 9:; 20041 
Edwin B. Pany-2532 
Attorney for Plaintiff •«——-. ._~ . . . 
3782 West 2340 South, Suite #B 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 486-2942 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES, 
INC., ; 
A Debt Collection Agency, ] 
Plaintiff, '; 
VS. 
SCOTT RICE d.b.a. MTI 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I Civil No. 030200718 DC 
l Judge: John C. Backlund 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for Trial on August 13,2004 at 
the hour of 11:45 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by its attorney, Edwin B. Parry, and 
Defendant by his attorneys, Blake S. Atkin and Lonn Litchfield. The Court having 
reviewed the pleadings in titiis matter, having heard the testimony presented by Jamie 
Grater for Plaintiff and Scott Rice for Defendant and for good cause appearing makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that Phone Directories Company, Inc. (Directories) and 
Memory Technologies, Inc. (MTI) entered into a written advertising contract wherein 
Directories agreed to place advertisements in the Provo and Mt Nebo directories on 
behalf of MTI and MTI agreed to pay for said ads. 
2. The Court finds that at the time the contract was signed, October 13, 2001, 
that MTI was an active Utah Corporation and that Scott Rice was an individual 
authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of MTI. 
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3. The Court finds that the contract between the Directories and MTI was 
entered into knowingly and intentionally by the parties and that the terms of the contract 
were spelled out on its face. The Court further finds that all parties to the contract were 
competent and fully capable of entering into said contract. 
4. The Defendant argued that Directories failed to comply with the terms of 
the contract in that Directories did not submit proofs of the ads to MTI or Rice prior to 
the publication of the ads. The Court, finds, based upon the evidence that proofs of the 
ads were mailed to MTI/Rice by Directories via first class mail as required in the written 
contract 
5. The Court finds that the ads were printed in the directories as provided in 
the contract between the parties. 
6. The Court finds that no payment was made pursuant to the contract 
between the parties. 
7. The Court finds that the amount due pursuant to the contract's face is 
$648.00. 
8. The Court finds that the contract in Paragraph 4 of the contract that 
MTI/Rice agreed to pay all costs of collection, which include collection agency fees. The 
Court further finds that the total due pursuant to the contract is $914.16 in principal and 
collection agency fees. 
9. The Court finds that Directories assigned the claim for the balance of 
$914.16 owed for the unpaid ads to Express Recovery Service, Inc. (ERS) and that said 
assignment was valid. 
2 
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10. The Court finds that at the time ERS commenced litigation in this matter 
that MTI had allowed its corporate status to expire. It further finds that MTI had been 
involuntarily suspended by the Department of Commerce at the time litigation had been 
commenced. 
11. The Court finds that the Department of Commerce subsequently reinstated 
MTI as a corporation and that it was a valid corporation at the time of the trial. 
12. The Court finds that the contract provides that the signer of the contract 
promises to personally guarantee payment of the obligation created thereby in the event 
the corporate obligor sells or discontinues the business. 
13. The Court finds that the language of Paragraph 11 of the contract creates 
personal liability in the signer of the contract on the occurrence of either of two 
conditions, either the sale of the business or the discontinuation of the business. 
14. The Court finds that due to the expiration and subsequent dissolution of 
MTFs corporate status that the business was discontinued and thus the conditions of the 
personal guarantee were met Accordingly Scott Rice, the signer of the contract, became 
personally liable for the contractual obligation pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the contract. 
15. The Court finds that the contract provides for payment of attorney fees if 
an attorney is retained to collect the sum due pursuant to the contract. 
16. The Court finds based upon the undisputed proffer of Plaintiffs attorney 
that prior to trial the attorney for Plaintiff had incurred a total of 23.0 hours in the 
preparation and prosecution of this litigation. 
3 
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17. The Court finds that Plaintiffs attorney bills at an hourly rate of $ 150.00 
per hour and that said rate is reasonable for similar services rendered in the area of 
practice. 
18. The Court finds that the attorney's fees to date of trial, but not including 
the trial itself, total $3450.00. 
19. The Court finds that Plaintiffs attorney is entitled to additional 
compensation for time spent at trial and in preparing the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and the Judgment in this matter as set forth in a supporting affidavit to accompany 
said pleadings. 
20. The Court finds that the contract provides for interest to accrue at tihe rate 
of 18% per annum on all unpaid accounts and that the interest owing to the date of trial is 
the sum of $52.29. 
21. The Court finds that court costs were incurred in this matter in the sum of 
$60.00 and that said costs are recoverable pursuant to the contract and Utah law. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING the Court enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The signed contract entered into between MTI and Directories is a valid 
and enforceable agreement between the parties. 
2. Directories complied with the all of the terms of the contract and 
performed as agreed therein. 
3. That the Defendant, Scott Rice, is personally responsible for the 
obligations created by the contract due to the personal guarantee provisions of the 
contract 
4 
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4. That Scott Rice is personally liable because at the time of the 
commencement of the litigation MTI did not exist as a legal entity due to the expiration 
of its charter and subsequent involuntary dissolution by the Department of Commerce. 
5. The Defendant argued that because the corporation was reinstated 
subsequent to the date litigation was commenced, and prior to trial, that pursuant to 
Section 16-10a-1422(4) Rice was not responsible for the obligation and the liability was 
strictly that of MTI. Defendant further argued that since the statute states that the 
reinstatement relates back to the date of dissolution that the MTI was the appropriate 
party to be pursued as the Defendant in this action. The Court rules that since the 
litigation was commenced prior to the reinstatement of MTI that Rice is the proper and 
only party defendant in this action because of the non-existence of MTI at the time the 
suit was commenced. As the signer of the contract containing a personal guarantee 
effective if the corporate entity "discontinues business" he became liable at the time the 
corporation was involuntarily dissolved. The Court rules that it is not the intent of the 
legislature to relieve individuals of obligations incurred during the period of dissolution 
by Section 16-10a-1422(4). Rather, it is to allow individuals dealing with a subsequently 
reinstated entity to hold the entity responsible for any acts made during the period of 
dissolution should the entity attempt to escape liability for those acts performed on its 
behalf during its period of dissolution. To argue that an individual can escape liabiUty for 
his personal guarantee when it is clearly effective at the time relief under the personal 
guarantee is sought is clearly beyond the scope of the intent of the legislature. The 
purpose of Section 16-10a-1422(4) is to protect those dealing with the entity while it is 
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dissolved not to protect individuals that may seek to escape personal liability by 
reinstating the entity after incurring personal liability. 
6. Defendant is liable and judgment should enter in the sum of $914.16 
principal together with interest in the sum of $52.29 interest and $60.00 costs of court. 
7. Defendant is liable and judgment should enter against him for attorney's 
fees incurred by Plaintiffs attorney in the prosecution of this action in the sum of 
$3450.00 plus additional attorney fees incurred in the actual trial of the case together with 
attorney fees for time expended for the preparation of these Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and the Judgment in this matter as supported by affidavit. 
8. Defendant is further liable for any after accrued interest at the rate of 18% 
per annum or 1 lA % per month until paid 
DATED this day of 2004. 
BY THE COURT 
(si n-ej 
John C. Backhand 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, together with a true and correct copy of an Affidavit for 
Attorney's Fees by United States Mail, first class postage prepaid this "Vp day of August, 
2004 to: 
Blake S. Atkin 
Lonn Litchfield 
Atkin & Hawkins, P.C. 
136 South Main, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
A/YY\Wft UM u 
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EDWIN B. PARRY C253S) 1132611 - 10 
Attorney -for PLAINTIFF 
3782 West P340 South, Suite B 
J .£. Ad<3<7?s Buiiding 
West Valley City, Utah 3<V120 
Telephone: (801) 43A-E94E 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, GREH DEPARTMENT 
EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES, INC. 
A Debt Collection Agency 
Plaintiff," COMPLAINT 
vs. 
Civil No.5 
SCOTT RICE , 
dba WTI 
32 E RED PINE DR, 
ALPINE, UT, 34004 
Defendant(s>. Judges 
COMES NOV* Plaintiff and complains against defendant and for cause 
of action alleges as follows* 
1. That the amount in controversy is less than $20,000.00. 
E. That plaintiff is a licensed and banded collection agency in full 
compliance with all laws and regulation pertaining thereto. 
3- That defendant resides in the County of UTAH or the 
contract giving rise to this action arose m UTAH County. 
4. That defendant and Phone Directories entered into a 
written goods ard/cr services agreement, which was duly assigned to 
Express Recovery Services, Inc., plaintiff herein, who is now the 
holder of all legal rights thereto. 
-23-
5. That services were provided to defendant on or before 10-13-01, 
and defendant is indebted pursuant to the contract, to the plaintiff for 
the sum of % 914.26, plas interest to date of $ 58.29. 
6. That defendant is obligated to p^ y attorney's fees pursuant to 
the contract• 
7. That demand for payment has been &ads and defendant has failed 
to pay the saq*e. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against defendant in the 
amount of $Si4.16 , interest to date of 532.29
 3 plus an attorney fee 
of $200.00 pursuant to Utah Code of Judicial Administration 4-505*1 
or as established by affidavit, for a total of sllSS.45 and costs of Court 
service fees, post-judgment interest as established by law and for 
such further relief as the Court deems proper. 
DATED 5 200.1 
This i s an a t tempt to c o l l e c t a debt and an^\ i n f o r m a t i o n obtained 
w i l l be used f o r that purpose. 
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Z&kjjJ*y 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS ^ r
 ?^ f, 5^> > ? 
1. PvWeherer^here ina^rrrKwPtone^ 
AoVertisarahal mean individual, DBA, partnership, assodatfon, Jortt slock 
company or corporation authorizing Hating* and/or advertising In this 
Directory, Directory h&reinafter shall mean project authorized by the 
Advertiser Jo he produced l?y trio Publisher. The partes wQt be bowd by thi 9 
contract when aign«d by me Advertiser and accepted by the Pubfarvir 
Neither party shaB bo bound by any special arrangements contrary to or in 
addition to the terms and conditions as stated herein or written hereon, and 
no agent or employes oi ifre Publisher has the authority 10 vary any terms of 
this appflcatJon. 
H. Uo£*£S OtheoK&a agmed upon arvl specified la writing, tjaan© am net oa^h 
with copy. If a statement its required, a five dollar bUtfr^ j charge w3 be added. 
This charge may be deducted W pay merit Is received by the due date 
specified on statement Interest wifl be charged at the rate of 1.5 percent per 
month on overdue accounts. -
3. Advertisers w»JI be eent one verification copy for each different display or m 
column ad. Changes can be made to the ad copy at that fame* tf proof is 
mailed to an Advertiser and said proof te not returned by Ac^artJser within the 
time set forth on tha proof sheet, it 13 mutuaKy understood and agreed that 
sakf proof shall be assumed to be correct Crwigestoadcopymustbe 
reoofoed In writing by the deadline specified on thA proof cop*. The Pubfcsher 
reserves the right to refuse changes received after this cteadfina. 
The ftm nam*, addreee, and telephone number as shown on the face of this 
contract am the criteria for correctness In each directory as subscribed. 
Pubtisher te noYrwsponsfcrtt for telephone rumter changes maoe by any 
party, ttlathe responsibility of the Advertiser to inform the pubfieher In writing 
of ejiycfvtmge In a^drass or telephone nurnber sbdy (60) daya pnoi to any 
Dfeectory fesue date.« 
4. If It become* necessary to employ legal or other services to dbtzux payment 
of any account when p*st due. Advertiser agrees to pay afl costs (or 
cofiecfion of said account Including but not Brn»edtoatton^yfBds.ando9urt 
costs Incurred to the collection of said delinquent account Discounts and 
special promotions wHI on)y be honored on currant accounts. Should an 
account become delinquent, full retail pfK»vrftt be irnmeolatery assessed. If 
Actertfcer has any account past due with PuoEsher, the Publisher, at Its sole 
discretion, may apply any deposits or payments made by the Advertiser 
under this cohtractto said past due accounts c* payment* due Publisher. 
Excess funds wR thereafter be credited to current contract account, 
5. Tne Publisher reserves the right to reject any or all advertising copy. Failure 
to furnish copy gives the Publisher ihe eight 10 make up cop? Uospavte 
poaroon for c&pfay advertising is guaranteed. 
6. Tha Publisher reserves the right to extend or reduce by not mora than so* ($) 
month* the Issue date and period of tr^ Directory. In no event shall the teeue 
date of the Directory be later than December 31 of the year succeeding the 
year ki which tnls contract Is entered Into by the Advertiser and Publisher 
7, If on errorln or omission of trwacfoenberrert 
negOgenc* of the Publisher, an no &vent shall the Pubit&here lability exceed 
the amount pad by the Advertiser for the item or Hems orrjfftad, orjtvwrjfeh 
&nor* occur, for the life of the Issue 0/ the dmctoty Irtvoiyed (ffu>r*ftfer^ 
should occur In display advertising, the foHowlrig'acltJStmenfcby.ftkttsJ^wS 
only be considered: 
a. Wrong mam number 100% 
b. Wrong alternate call number 15% 
c. Wrong address up to 25% 
d. Incorrect speffing of a business name up to 25% 
e. Incorrect spettfog of a word none 
Mo adjustment wfl be considered on free classifications^Advertiser shall. 
notify Publisher within three (3) months after publication of any claim for* 
credit he is claiming under this paragraph. After this, any credrt wfilbe 
forfeited. 
8. In the event of a dispute arising out of this contract, ihe patles'aflree that 
Utah law »to be applied. 
9. The perron signing this contract warrants that terafiautrwftyforftndln 
teJ^pftteMvertJsestodosa. U\ addition, the slgnatfon behalf of the* 
Advertiser, represents and warrants that ha is a DuJyAulhortoed Agsntfbcjh 
Product or Service to be advertised and that the use c f e ^ Track iv1ari£ Log 
or Trade Kerne appearing in tha advertising hereby contracted for has. been 
authorized by the Owner or Owners thereof.' The Advertiser agrees that he 
will hold the Pubksher harmless from any and alcfaims!ajid e l a n d s ^ 
asserted against the Publisher by reason of the falsity of any portion of safe* 
advertising or the unauthorized use of any Trade Mark, Logo, Copyright or 
Trade Name InersSrw » 
10. Canceflaoon may oemade by the Advertiser providing such notice of 
£&noe&uJ0/? Is made in writing atd receded by the PiubUsher wtfhta ten (10) 
days of foe date of this contract No i»iceDatk?iw wW be accepted after thl» 
time. Publisher reserves the right to cancel this contract wRhin ten (10)daya 
of the contract arrival in Publish*/** Oram Office, 77>e Publisher will hO%-**fi 
Advertiser m writing within ten (10} days of such cancellation, 
11. if Advertiser safe or discontinues business before or after publication of the 
Directory, no payment or amount duo under matftim* of this cotttra^wifiod 
waived thereby. The signer of the Contract guarantees payment of the ' 
amount && ertner directly or through escrow If business la sold, payment o 
amount duo may be assumed by the New Owner, If name of buemeee and 
phone number remain ttve Sfime, 
12. Reasonable cam is taken to see that the Directory delivery le accurate. 
However, Pub&fter does not guarantee a 100% d&tuery eoourexy. 
13. Publisher reserves the right to convert Into a cash equivalent any trade 
balance Advemsar refuses to honor* 
WRU White aegule/ Listing 
WBL White Bold Usting 
SWBL Super While Bold Listing 
S WLL Super WhHe Logo Listing 
CRL Classified Regular Listing 
CBL Cfess&td Boki listing 
AHL Anchor Refl^tr Listing 
A8L Anchor Bold Using 
EL r _ExtraLinew^ 
1HS
 x1/2 Inch Space Listing 
2HS 1 inch Space t Jsting « 
3HS- - 1 1/2 Inch fipjkce Listing 
4HS 2 Inch Space Listing 
IPC Inside Front Co/er 
IBC inside BacK Cover 
OBC Outside Back Covor 
2 d Wd^_t7:T0 £ 0 0 2 8 0 "fi^W 
ADVERTISING ITEMS 
4HSO 2 inch Space Ustmg/Dtsplay 
5H$ 21/J Inch Space Usbng 
6HSO 2 1/2 Inch Space Usting/D*spJay 
8HS 3 Inch Space Usting 
6HSD 3 Inch Space Lisimg/DiepJayj 
OC Quarter Column 
HC HaifCoAjmn 
DOC Double OuanV Column 
TOG Tnple Quarter Column 
3/4C Three Quarters Column* 
DHC Double Half Column 
FC Full Column 
4QC 4 Quarter Column** 
COVER/SPECIAL 
CI Color Insert 
CPN Coupon (Must have display nd 
THC Triple Half Column* 
TOQC Triple Dooblo Quarter Column ^ 
AHG
 r . f^rjurfM.Oolurr^^.^l^K&^^L 
t76T99^.^T08 r25. ON 3NOHd 
UflOonkw(«<Wtl1 
I ID ^o ^ow3 : WOdJ 
'DIRECTORIES 
COM/VOT 
r P o R A r v o 
'* h**'m takiftnon C**c*ctyau. ptearcdk 
<?01)Z&<#01 • KM 001) HW091 
Phone Director^* Company 
Pwt*.UT 84605-0**7 
. Tbttfi«;I-«Ofl-S53^M0I 
Publication /7w o 
Issue r1^ Salesperson, 
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1 Adiif csa V * j 
. . . . - <^^/ / 
City 
. Phone 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a copy of the APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed first class, 
postage prepaid this 2- ' day of October, 2006 to the following: 
Edwin B. Parry 
3782 West 2340 South, Suite #B 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
